Abstract. In this paper we examine the strength of AES-256 against the related-key impossible differential attack, following the work in [1] and [2] . Firstly, we present a carefully chosen relation between the related keys, which can be extended to 8-round(even more rounds) subkey differences. Then, we construct a 5.5-round related-key impossible differential. Using the differential, we present an attack on 7-round AES-256 and four attacks on 8-round AES-256.
Introduction
AES [3] supports 128-bit block size with three different key lengths (128, 192 ,and 256 bits). In this paper, we examine the stength of 256-bit key version of AES(AES-256) against the related-key impossible differential attack.
Related-key attacks [4] allow an attacker to obtain plaintext-ciphertext pairs by using related(but unknown) keys. The attacker first searches for possible weaknesses of the encryption and key schedule algorithms, then choose appropriate relation between keys and make two encryptions using the related keys expecting to derive the unknown key information. The complexity of the attack depends on the ability of the attacker to predict the propagation of the key difference during the key schedule. Related-key differential attacks [5] study the development of differences in two encryptions under two related keys. Impossible differential attacks [6, 7] use differentials that hold with probability 0(or non-existing differentials) to eliminate wrong key material and leave the right key candidate. And in this case, the attack is called related-key impossible differential attack.
Among the three variants of AES, the key schedule of AES-256 is a little different from those of AES-128 and AES-192. Let N K denote the number of words of the seed key, thus N K = 4 for AES-128, N K = 6 for AES-192 and N K = 8 for AES-256. In the key schedule of AES-128 and AES-192, the nonlinear transformation is applied only once every N K word. While for the key schedule of AES-256, non-linear transformation is applied twice every N K words. Thus, it seems that AES-256 is relatively more immune to related-key attacks compared with AES-128 and AES-256. The best known related-key attack on AES-256 uses boomerang cryptanalysis and it is applicable to a 10-round variant of AES-256 [10] . And the best known non-related-key attack on AES-256 uses integral cryptanalysis [11] , and is applicable to 8-round AES-256, which needs almost the whole data of plaintext space.
Because of the importance of AES, it's very necessary to constantly reevaluate the security of AES under various cryptanalytic techniques. Concerning related-key impossible differential cryptanalysis, there has already several works against reduced-round AES-192 [1, 8] , whereas few work on AES-256. In this paper, we will study the strength of AES-256 against related-key impossible differential attack.
The work in this paper follows those in [1, 2] , and start the attack from the very beginning. Firstly, we carefully choose an appropriate relation between the two related keys, which can be extended to 8-round(even more rounds) subkeys difference using the key schedule of AES-256. Next, we construct a 5.5-round related-key impossible differential characteristic. Using this characteristic, we then present an attack against 7-round AES-256 and four attacks against 8-round AES-256. The results in this paper is summarized in Table 1 , with the results in [2] for comparison, from which we can see that AES-256 have better resistance than AES-192 using the same cryptanalytic approach.
Here is the outline of the paper. In Section 2, we give a brief description of AES. In Section 3, we carefully choose a key difference between the two related keys, and present the corresponding 8-round subkeys difference. Then a 5.5-round related-key impossible differential is constructed. Section 4 give an attack against 7-round AES-256; and Section 5 present four variants of attacks against 8-round AES-256. Finally, Section 6 summarizes this paper. • SubBytes(SB): applyinging the S-box on each byte.
• ShiftRows(SR): cyclically shifting each row (the i 'th row is shifted by i bytes to the left). The MixColumns operation is omitted in the last round, and an additional AddRoundKey operation is performed before the first round. As all other works on AES, we also assume that the Mixcolumns operation is omitted in the last round of the reduced-round variants.
The number of rounds is dependent on the key size, 10 rounds for 128 bits, 12 for 192 bits and 14 for 256 bits.
The key schedule of AES-256 is slightly different from that of AES-128 and AES-256. It takes the 256-bit secret key and expands it to 15 128-bit subkeys, and SubBytes operation is applied twice every 8 words. The expanded key is a linear array of 4-byte words and is denoted by G [4 × 15] . Firstly, the 256-bit seed key is divided into 8 words G[0], G [1] . . . G [7] . Then, perform the following: Figure 1 exhibit the key schedule algorithm of AES-256.
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Notations
In the rest of this paper, we will use the following notations: x Let k i denote the subkey in the i'th round, and the initial whitening subkey is k 0 . In some cases, the order of the MixColumns and the AddRoundKey operation in the same round is changed, which is done by repalacing the subkey k i with an equivalent subkey w i , where 
A 5.5-Round Related-Key Impossible Differential of AES-256
We will choose the difference between the two related keys as follows:
Hence, through the key schedule, the subkey differences in the first 8 rounds are as presented in Table 2 , which will be used in our attacks. Note that the subkey differences can be extended to more rounds, only one more unknown byte come forth when one round is added. Table 2 .Subkey Differences Required for the attacks in this paper 
Throughout the attacks in this paper, we assume that the subkey differences are as presented in Table 2 . And the attacks presented in this paper start from the very beginning, only two related keys are needed.
In the following, we will present a 5.5-round related-key impossible differential as in [1] and [2] . Firstly, a 4.5-round related-key differential with probability 1 in the forward direction, then a 1-round related-key differential with probability 1 in the reverse direction, where the intermediate differences contradict each other. The 5.5-round related-key impossible differential is: The first 4.5-round differential is constructed as follows: the input difference ∆x 
A 7-Round Related-Key Impossible Differential attack
Using the above impossible differential, we present an attack on 7-round variant of AES-256 in this section. At first, we assume that the values of a, b, c and d are all knownie., we have two related keys K 1 and K 2 with the required subkey differences listed in Table 2 . We will deal with conditions on the related keys to achieve these subkey differences at the end of this section.
In this 7-round attack, we will choose the impossible differential in which Column 3 (the last column) of ∆x 
Analysis of the attack complexity:
There are m plaintexts each in S 1 and S 2 , which can form m 2 possible ciphertext pairs (C 1 , C 2 ). In Step 3, the filtering is done using a 24-bit condition, thus there are about 2 −24 m 2 pairs in each bin of the hash Hence, we need to repeat the attack for all the values of b and c. Therefore,the total time complexity is multiplied by 2 14 , the data and memory complexity remain unchanged.
To sum up,the total complexity of the above attack is as follows:The data complexity is 2 52 chosen plaintexts, the time complexity is 2 87 encryptions, and the required memory is 2 69 bytes.
Four 8-Round Related-Key Impossible Differential attacks
In this section, we will give four variant attacks on 8-round AES-256. All the four attacks presented are based on the 7-round attack in section 4. As in [1] and [2] , the main difference between them is a data-time trade-off. In all the 8-round attacks, we guess part of the last round subkey k 8 , peel off the last round and apply the 7-round attack. In order to reduce the amount of key bits guess, we also change the order of the MixColumns and the AddRoundKey operations in the 7'th round, this is done by replacing the subkey k 7 with an equivalent subkey w 7 . And we use x W 7 to denote the intermediate value after the application of AddRoundKey operation with w 7 in the 7'th round.
If (∆x
, then after the SubBytes and ShiftRows operations in the 7'th round, bytes 1,4,14 must be zero. Next, applying the key addition with w 7 , we can get (∆x
In order to satisfy the above conditions and make less subkey material guess, we treat only ciphertext pairs that have certain properties. Take for example, to make (∆x The First Attack Guess all the 16 bytes of k 8 , then peel off the 8'th round, and applying the above 7-round attack.
Here we can use the differential properties of the key schedule algorithm. The value of c can be determined by b and (k 6 ) 15 = (k 8 are zero too, and uses a 16-bit condition. Then, guess byte 11 of w 7 and continue partial decryption to find out whether (∆x O 6 ) 7 = b holds, which is done using a 8-bit condition. After this filtering, the remaining ciphertext pairs can be used to discard wrong subkey guesses like in the 7-round attack.
In this variant of the attack, we guess a total of 112 subkey bits. And a portion of 2 −56 of the pairs can be used in the attack to discard the wrong subkey guesses.
Here we can use the differential properties of the key schedule algorithm. The value of c can be determined by b and (k 6 ) 15 = (k 8 ) 11 ⊕ (k 8 ) 15 . Hence, we only need to repeat the attack for all the possible values of b and d respectively.
Choose a structure of 2 64 plaintexts which differ only at the eight bytes 0,3,4,5,9,10,14 and 15, and having all possible values in these bytes. Encrypt it under 2 related keys each, which are equivalent to 2 65 chosen plaintexts. One structure proposes about 2 64 × 2 64 × 1 2 = 2 127 pairs of plaintexts. So about 1 structure is needed to get about 2 71 data pairs for every guess of the 112 bits in the last two rounds, which can be used to delete wrong subkey guesses. Each pair discards one possible value for the eight byte guess of subkey k 0 on average. Therefore, the probability that some wrong subkey guess remains is at most 7 and continue partial decryption to find out whether (∆x O 6 ) 7 = b holds. This is done using a 8-bit condition. After this filtering, the remaining ciphertext pairs can be used to discard wrong subkey guesses like in the 7-round attack.
In this variant of the attack, we guess a total of 88 subkey bits. But only a portion of 2 −80 of the pairs can be used in the attack to discard the wrong subkey guesses.
As in the first attack, the value of c can be determined by b and subkeys guess of k 8 of the possible ciphertext pairs. Then the difference ∆x I 8 is known, we check whether the difference in bytes 0, 7 and 12 are z 0 , z 7 and z 12 respectively. This filtering is done using a 24-bit condition. Thus, the remaining ciphertext pairs all satisfy that byte 4,5,6 in ∆x O 6 are all zero. Then, guess byte 11 of w 7 and continue partial decryption to find out whether (∆x O 6 ) 7 = b holds. This is done using a 8-bit condition. After this filtering, the remaining ciphertext pairs can be used to discard wrong subkey guesses like in the 7-round attack.
In this attack variant, we guess only 64 subkey bits. But only a portion of 2 −104 of the pairs can be used in the attack. This leads to a relatively high data complexity, but to a lower time complexity.
The value of c can be determined by b and (k 6 ) 15 =(k 8 ) 11 ⊕ (k 8 ) 15 . Hence, we only need to repeat the attack for all the possible values of b and d respectively.
About 2
48 structures are needed to get about 2 71 data pairs which can be used to delete wrong subkey guesses. Hence, the data complexity of this attack is about 2 112 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity is about 2 14 × 2 71 × 2 64 /2 6 = 2 143 .
Using related-key cryptanalysis, better results are achieved against reducedround AES compared with other traditional cryptanalysis approaches up to now. This fact reflects some weaknesses of the key schedule algorithm of AES.
In this paper, we researched the ability of AES-256 against the related-key impossible differential attack. Among the results, we give an attack against 7-round AES-256, and four attacks against 8-round AES-256. The carefully chosen related-key difference made our attack start from the very beginning, not from the third round as in [1] , which reduce the attack complexity by a factor of 2
